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ABSTRACT
In multi-hop cellular networks, data packets have to be re-
layed hop by hop from a given mobile station to a base
station and vice-versa. This means that the mobile sta-
tions must accept to forward information for the beneﬁt of
other stations. In this paper, we propose an incentive mech-
anism that is based on a charging/rewarding scheme and
that makes collaboration rational for selﬁsh nodes. We base
our solution on symmetric cryptography to cope with the
limited resources of the mobile stations. We provide a set of
protocols and study their robustness with respect to various
attacks. By leveraging on the relative stability of the routes,
our solution leads to a very moderate overhead.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Multi-hop cellular networks combine the characteristics of
both cellular and wireless mobile ad hoc networks. As with
cellular networks, the geographic area covered by the net-
work is populated with base stations that are connected to
each other via a backbone. However, in multi-hop cellular
networks, the existence of a communication link between the
mobile station and the base station is not required; Indeed,
in this new approach, the communication between the mo-
bile station and the base station is, in general, relayed by
a (usually small) number of other mobile stations. Multi-
hop cellular networks can be perceived as an evolution of
either voice-centric networks such as GSM or data-centric
networks such as CDPD or IEEE 802.11.
Several beneﬁts can be expected from the use of this new
family of networks [23, 13, 24, 21]: (i) the number of ﬁxed
antennas can be smaller; (ii) the energy consumption of the
nodes can be reduced, as the distance the signal has to cover
is smaller1; (iii) the interference with other nodes diminishes
as well; (iv) the coverage of the network can be increased.
The proper operation of the network requires the mobile
nodes to collaborate with each other. Such a constraint does
not exist in conventional cellular networks. In particular, it
is clear that a node must be “encouraged” in some way to re-
lay information for the beneﬁt of other nodes. In the absence
of such an incentive, a dishonest user could tamper with his
mobile device to convert it into a purely “selﬁsh one”; this
tampering is maybe beyond the ability of the casual user,
but certainly not of a dishonest “techie” or organization.
In this paper, we provide an in-depth study of the problem
and we propose a solution based on appropriate charging
and rewarding mechanisms of the nodes.
The work presented in this paper is part of the Termin-
odes Project [18, 3, 15]. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. We describe the related work in section 2 and
introduce our system and adversarial model in Section 3. In
Section 4, we describe our approach and detail our require-
ments. In Section 5, we provide a detailed description of
the protocols. In Sections 6 and 7 we discuss the security
and the overhead of the solution, respectively. Finally, we
present our conclusions and future work in Section 8.
1The transmission energy grows more than linearly with the
distance at which the signal must be received.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss some works related to the issues
of multi-hop cellular networks, secure source routing and
cooperation of nodes in (pure) ad hoc networks and in multi-
hop cellular networks.
• Multi-hop cellular networks: In [1], Aggelou et al.
describe the Ad Hoc GSM (A-GSM) system, which in-
tegrates relaying functions in GSM cellular network,
focusing on the network layer, whereas in the SO-
PRANO project [33], Zadeh et al. investigate the self-
organization aspect of such a network. Opportunity
Driven Multiple Access (ODMA) allows terminals to
use multi-hop communications to reach the base sta-
tion if they are beyond the reach of the cell coverage
[12]. In both [2] and [31], Bejerano and Wu et al. study
the beneﬁt of installing relaying stations (also called
access points) to provide the nodes with an access to
a backbone.
• Secure Source Routing: In [16], Hu et al. present
a secure on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol
(Ariadne) that uses symmetric cryptographic primi-
tives to prevent attacks in mobile ad hoc networks.
They present an attacker model and analyze the ro-
bustness of their protocol against various attacks. In
[17], they consider the wormhole attack and propose a
mechanism, called packet leashes, to detect this speciﬁc
attack in mobile ad hoc networks. In [28], Papadimi-
tratos and Haas propose a secure route discovery pro-
tocol that provides the nodes with accurate connec-
tivity information, despite the existence of malicious
nodes in the network. They study the robustness of the
protocol against non-colluding attackers. In [29], Paul
and Westhoﬀ propose a mechanism to detect routing
misbehavior in DSR based ad hoc networks and to in-
form the nodes about the identity of the attacker(s).
An overview of security in wireless mobile ad hoc net-
works is presented in [7].
• Cooperation in ad hoc networks: Several research
groups have considered the problem of selﬁshness and
stimulation of cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks.
In [25], Marti et al. consider the case where a node
agrees to cooperate but fails to do so. Their solution
uses a “watchdog” mechanism to identify the misbe-
having nodes and a “pathrater” mechanism to con-
struct routes that avoid those nodes. Both the CON-
FIDANT [5] and the CORE [27] approaches propose a
reputation based solution to identify and punish mis-
behaving nodes. In [6, 8], Buttya´n and Hubaux use
a virtual currency called nuglets to charge and reward
the provision of the packet forwarding service in ad hoc
networks while in [34], Zhong et al. rely on a central
authority that collects receipts from the forwarding
nodes and charges/rewards the nodes based on these
receipts.
• Cooperation in multi-hop cellular networks: In
[22], Lamparter et al. propose a charging scheme to
motivate cooperation in hybrid networks (i.e., mobile
ad hoc networks with access to the Internet, what they
call “stub ad hoc networks”). They assume the ex-
istence of an Internet Service Provider that authenti-
cates the nodes involved in a given communication (us-
ing public key cryptography) and takes care of charg-
ing or rewarding them.
In [19], we have proposed a micro-payment scheme for
multi-hop cellular networks that encourages collabora-
tion in packet forwarding. However, our current pro-
posal signiﬁcantly diﬀers from [19] in many aspects.
First of all, in [19], we assume an asymmetric com-
munication model, where the up-stream (mobile to
base station) communication is potentially multi-hop
and the down-stream (base station to mobile) commu-
nication is always single-hop, whereas in this paper,
the communication model is symmetric, meaning that
both the up-stream and the down-stream communica-
tions are potentially multi-hop. Second, in [19], the
nodes report a fraction of their packet forwarding ac-
tions (on a probabilistic basis) to an accounting center
that determines how the nodes are remunerated based
on the received reports. The approach proposed in this
paper does not rely on reports; instead, we use the con-
cept of session during which each node involved in the
communication (i.e., the initiator, the correspondent
and the forwarding nodes) authenticates itself to the
base station by altering the packet to be forwarded in
a speciﬁc way. Finally, the protocol proposed in [19]
includes routing decisions, whereas the protocols that
we propose in this paper are independent of routing,
and hence, can be used with existing (secure) source
routing schemes.
3. MODEL
3.1 System and trust model
Our system consists of a set of base stations connected to
a high speed backbone and a set ofmobile nodes. The mobile
nodes use the base stations and, if necessary, the backbone
to communicate with each other. Communication between
the mobile nodes and the base stations is based on wireless
technology. We assume that all communication is packet-
based and that the initiator of the communication pays for
the provided service2. We also assume that the links are
symmetric (i.e., the nodes and the base stations have the
same power range).
The geographical area under the control of a given base
station is called a cell [23]. The power range of the base
station is smaller than the radius of the cell. This means
that some nodes in the cell may not be able to communicate
with the base station directly; communication between these
nodes and the base station is based on multi-hop relaying
performed by intermediate mobile nodes.
When a mobile node A (the initiator) wants to establish a
communication with another mobile node B (the correspon-
dent), it ﬁrst has to establish an end-to-end session with B
(as we will see in detail in Subsection 5.2, a session is a
route on which all nodes are authenticated). This is done
by establishing an initiator session between A and the base
station of the initiator BSA and a correspondent session be-
2In this paper, we consider the case where the initiator is
the main beneﬁciary of the service and thus should pay for it
(e.g., e-mail). The proposed solution can easily be adapted
to the case where the correspondent beneﬁts from the ser-
vice.
tween the base station of the correspondent BSB and B.
These sessions are used to exchange packets between A and
B, in both directions. For each packet, we call S its source
(which can be A or B) and D its destination (which is there-
fore B or A, respectively). The base stations of the source
and of the destination are called BSS and BSD , respectively.
The packet is then sent, ﬁrst from S to BSS (if necessary
in multiple hops using intermediate mobile nodes as relays).
If S and D reside in two diﬀerent cells, then the packet is
forwarded by BSS to BSD via the backbone. Finally, the
packet is sent from BSD to D (if necessary in multiple hops
again)3. The protocols remain the same if the packet is sent
from initiator A to the correspondent B or from B to A,
except for the charging and remuneration phase (see Sub-
section 5.7).
We assume an ad hoc model in which mobile nodes move.
However, mobility should not be so high that the routing has
to be performed on packet based granularity, but rather on
a session-to-session basis. When A wants to communicate
with B, two routes are established (using source routing):
the initiator route (from A to BSA) and the correspondent
route (from BSB to B). These routes are used either until
the end of the session, or until one of them is broken by
the movement of one or more mobile nodes on the path
(including A and B). If one of these routes is broken during
the session, then a new route is established and used in the
same manner as the ﬁrst one.
Note that our system model described above is similar to
that of [23] with the diﬀerence that we require all commu-
nication to pass through a base station. Although this may
lead to suboptimal routes when the initiator and the corre-
spondent are not neighbors but are close to each other, our
model has the advantage of signiﬁcantly reducing the com-
plexity of routing from the nodes’ point of view, since they
only have to maintain a single route (the route to the base
station) instead of one route per potential correspondent. In
other words, if the correspondent B is not a neighbor, then
the initiator A simply sends the packet towards the base
station and does not need to run route discovery to ﬁnd a
route to B. Of course, a base station has to maintain a route
to every and every node in its cell. This can be based on
a traditional source route discovery protocol such as DSR
[20] or alternatively, the base station can obtain down-link
routing information from up-link packets (packets sent by
the source S to BSS ) assuming that those packets carry the
route (i.e., source routing is used) and that the links are
bidirectional.
In order to make the presentation easier, we assume that
all the base stations and the backbone are operated by a sin-
gle operator, although our proposal can easily be extended
to the general case where the base stations and the back-
bone(s) are under the control of several operators. We fur-
ther assume that the network operator is fully trusted by
all mobile nodes, be it for charging, for route setup, or for
packet forwarding. The network operator is the authority
who tries to make sure that all users obey the rules, and
in particular that they respect the charging mechanism de-
scribed hereafter.
3Clearly, the communication ends (on the initiator side and
on the correspondent side) are not necessarily both wireless.
However, in this paper, we assume that to be the case as
this corresponds to the most complete scenario.
3.2 Adversarial model
A coordinating adversary: Although our system must
tolerate the existence of many independent attackers, we
use the common cryptographic approach of considering all
of these attackers to be controlled by one and the same ad-
versary. Note that this is a pessimistic assumption, as it
increases the power of the attackers; seen another way, it is
clear that any security guarantees that are possible in such
a model can be transferred to a model in which individual
attackers work independently of each other.
A rational adversary: As we will consider and secure
our protocols against very strong attacks, it should be em-
phasized that our protocols will not be secure against arbi-
trary malicious behavior. Instead, a principal assumption
we will make is that the adversary is rational, in that it will
only attempt to cheat if the expected beneﬁt of doing so is
greater than the expected beneﬁt of acting honestly. This is
reasonable, in particular, given that the underlying routing
structure (given any existing secure source routing protocol)
is not believed to withstand arbitrary attacks. An adversary
will determine the expected monetary beneﬁt of a certain set
of actions, along with the expected degree of service (namely
of being able to use the communication infrastructure to
send messages) and the cost of his actions (measured in the
required battery and CPU resources). Rational behavior re-
quires him to select the behavior that minimizes his costs
and maximizes his beneﬁt.
Incentives – a double-edged sword: It should be
noticed that the introduction of monetary rewards in the
system may act not only as an incentive for collaboration,
but also (for a poorly designed system) as an incentive for
cheating. Note that this applies to the underlying routing
scheme as well: if it is rational for an adversary to corrupt
routing tables (both his own and those of others), then he
will attempt to do just that. However, securing the rout-
ing protocol is beyond the scope of this paper and thus we
assume that routing tables are not corrupted. As we have
seen in Section 2, several solutions to secure source routing
in ad hoc networks exist (e.g. [16], [28] or [29]) and can be
used as underlying routing mechanism in our protocol.
A two-tiered model: As in many other systems need-
ing to protect themselves against theft of service, it makes
sense to consider two types of attacks, which we will refer
to as ﬁltering and invasive attacks.
• Filtering attack: In this type of attack, the adver-
sary can observe and modify both the input and the
output of each device he controls, but he cannot ex-
tract the secret information from these devices. One
can think of this as an external ﬁltering of the data, but
it should be made clear both that it does not have to be
external (but may correspond to a change of software,
where applicable), and that ﬁltering does not mean a
simple removal of data, but that the adversary may
add and modify data as well. The functional descrip-
tion of the adversarial behavior corresponds closely to
the common assumption of tamper-proofness.
• Invasive attack: In this type of attack, the adversary
may – in addition to what he can do in the ﬁltering
attack – extract all secret information of the controlled
devices and distribute this information to the individ-
ual devices, incorporating this into the ﬁltering mech-
anisms of these.
For both of these attack models, we assume that the net-
work operator may obtain access to one or more of the cor-
rupted devices, allowing them to determine its exact con-
tents, i.e., the ﬁlter algorithm and its data (it is important
to notice that the security of our scheme does not rely on
this assumption; although, it does beneﬁt from it).
Both of the above attack models are worthwhile to con-
sider. To allow the best possible analysis of our proposed
system, we consider a two-tiered adversarial model, corre-
sponding to these two types of attack. The development
and use of such a two-tiered model allows us to produce and
present very precise security statements. Due to space limi-
tations, we place an emphasis on the ﬁltering attack herein
and only brieﬂy describe the tools needed to obtain security
against the invasive attack.
For concreteness, let us mention a few attacks that the
adversary may try to perform and that will be covered by
our security model:
• Refusal to pay: A party may claim that he did not
initiate some communication, and therefore should not
pay for it.
• Dishonest rewards: A party may try to make it ap-
pear that he was involved in the forwarding of certain
packets – potentially with the help of a colluder that
really did handle the packets – and therefore demand
to be remunerated.
• Free riding: Two dishonest parties on the route be-
tween two honest parties may attempt to piggyback
data on the packets sent between the honest parties,
with the goal of not having to pay for the communi-
cation. This attack is not limited to the appending
of data, but may also involve substitution. In view of
our approach to charging (see Subsection 5.7), we can
also identify an even more serious form of free riding
in which the initiator passes information free of charge
to a colluding intermediate node F on the up-stream
route to the base station by sending packets to a ﬁctive
destination. The packets are routed through F , who
simply drops them after extracting the payload. Since
the base station received no packet, the initiator will
not be charged and the forwarding nodes will thus not
be remunerated.
We propose a protocol that provides security against the
above attacks, and at the same time, oﬀers incentives for
collaboration.
4. APPROACH AND REQUIREMENTS
In order to motivate the nodes to forward traﬃc for the
beneﬁt of other nodes, we propose to remunerate the for-
warding nodes. Remuneration is made possible by charging
the initiator A of the communication (for the traﬃc in both
directions, i.e., from A to the correspondent B or from B to
A) and rewarding the forwarding nodes (and the operator).
We take advantage of the presence of the trusted operator
and assume that it maintains a billing account for every
node in the system; our remuneration scheme is then imple-
mented by manipulating the appropriate billing accounts.
A question that arises at this point is “Under what cir-
cumstances exactly should the initiator A be charged for a
packet sent by a source S to a destination D (where one of
these entities is the initiator A and the other is the corre-
spondent B)?”. One option would be to charge A only if the
packet has successfully been delivered to D. The problem
here is that due to the multi-hop nature of the communi-
cation, the packet may be delivered to D by an interme-
diate mobile node instead of the base station BSD , which
means that the operator may have no reliable information
about the delivery. This may require D to acknowledge the
packet, but the source and the destination can collude and
agree not to send acknowledgments. In this way, the ini-
tiator would escape from being charged, and if it provides
the correspondent with a fraction of the saved charge, or it
returns the favor to the correspondent when they play op-
posite roles, then they are both better oﬀ by cheating than
behaving honestly. Therefore, we decided to charge the ini-
tiator before the packet is delivered to the destination. Since
we require every packet to pass through a base station, it is
convenient to charge the initiator when the base station of
the source BSS receives the packet.
As for crediting the forwarding nodes, the up-stream for-
warding nodes (i.e., the nodes that are in the route between
S and BSS ) are remunerated when the packet is received by
the base station BSS , whereas the down-stream forwarding
nodes (i.e., the nodes that are in the route between BSD
and D) are remunerated only if the packet is delivered to
the destination D. As we saw in the previous paragraph,
the operator may not have reliable information about the
delivery of the packet, therefore we require the destination
to acknowledge the reception of the packet. Note, however,
that in this case, not sending the acknowledgement does not
help the initiator to escape from being charged, since it has
already been charged. Therefore, the only reason for not
sending the acknowledgement is for D to save resources. In
order to overcome this problem and motivate the destination
to send acknowledgements, the destination of the packet is
charged for a small amount ε when the base station BSD
injects the packet in the down-stream route and reimbursed
when the acknowledgment is received by a base station. The
acknowledgement scheme that we propose is lightweight and
oﬀ-line (as explained in Subsection 5.6).
The essence of our proposal is a set of protocols that allow
the operator to collect information based on which it can
decide which accounts should be charged and which accounts
should be credited. Our design seeks to satisfy the following
requirements:
• Authentication of the source and the destina-
tion. The operator should be able to reliably identify
the source and the destination of every packet received
by the base stations in order to know which account
to charge. By satisfying this requirement, we want to
prevent refusal to pay attacks.
• Authentication of the forwarding nodes. The
operator must be able to reliably identify the forward-
ing nodes (both in the initiator and in the correspon-
dent routes) during the session setup phase, and later
verify that this exact set of nodes participated in the
forwarding of each packet. The latter may be done ei-
ther using standard authentication techniques, or, as
we propose in our scheme, using what one may think
of as an “implicit” authentication mechanism (see the
usage of the cipher stream encryptions/decryptions in
Subsection 5.3).
For eﬃciency reasons, our protocols are entirely based on
symmetric key cryptography. Although asymmetric crypto-
graphic primitives, especially digital signatures, may seem to
be more suitable for implementing some of the functions of
our scheme, they have a high computational overhead (com-
pared to symmetric key primitives), which prevents their
application in resource constrained mobile devices.
We require each node to register with the operator in order
to be able to use the system. When a node i registers,
it receives a long-term symmetric key Ki, which is shared
between i and the operator (i.e., all base stations). Ki is the
only long-term cryptographic material stored in the node; it
is used to authenticate i either as a source, as a destination,
or as a forwarder of packets.
We assume that source routing is used in the network to
determine a packet’s path from the source to the base sta-
tion BSS and from the base station BSD to the destination,
otherwise our protocols are independent of the routing pro-
tocol. We note that with minor modiﬁcations, our proposal
can be extended to work with other types of routing algo-
rithms as well (e.g., distance vector routing). This means
that our scheme could potentially be used with any existing
and future ad hoc routing protocols.
5. PROTOCOLS
5.1 Building blocks and notation
Our protocols use two cryptographic building blocks: a
MAC (Message Authentication Code4) function and a stream
cipher.
• Message Authentication Codes: A MAC function
is a one-way function that takes as input a message m
and a key K, and outputs a digest µ = MACK(m).
Here, µ depends on bothm andK; does not reveal any
information about the keyK; and cannot be computed
without knowledge of the same. MACs are used for
allowing the integrity and authenticity of data.
• Stream cipher: A stream cipher function is a one-
way function that takes as input a short seed σ and
produces an arbitrarily long sequence of pseudo-ran-
dom bits from this seed. By XORing a segment of the
output of a stream cipher to a plaintext, one obtains a
ciphertext; this can be decrypted (to obtain the initial
plaintext) by XORing the same segment of the out-
put to the ciphertext. Note that if two parties both
know the seed σ (as is common for this application),
this technique can be used to encrypt – and decrypt
– messages of arbitrary and variable length. If, in ad-
dition, the output stream is indexable by means of a
position pos, it is – given this indexing position – easy
to decrypt ciphertexts out of order, even if some are
lost.
Further notation: In the following description, we will
denote the concatenation operator by | and the XOR oper-
ator by ⊕. In the session setup phase (see Subsection 5.2),
we denote the initiator and the correspondent of a given
communication by A and B, respectively. We call BSA the
base station of the initiator and BSB the base station of the
4Throughout this paper, MAC will stand for Message Au-
thentication Code and not for Medium Access Control.
correspondent. The number of relaying nodes in the initia-
tor route (from A to BSA) and in the correspondent route
(from BSB to B) are denoted by a and b, respectively. In
the packet sending phase (see Subsection 5.3), we denote
the source and the destination of a given packet by S and
D, respectively. We call BSS the base station of the source
and BSD the base station of the destination. The number of
relaying nodes in the up-stream route (from S to BSS ) and
in the down-stream route (from BSD to D) are denoted by
s and d, respectively.
5.2 Session setup
When a node A wants to communicate with another node
B, it ﬁrst has to set up an end-to-end session. The goal
of the session setup is to test the initiator and the corre-
spondent routes obtained from the underlying source rout-
ing protocol, to inform the nodes on these routes about the
traﬃc that will follow and to let the base stations authen-
ticate all nodes belonging to these routes. Any node on the
routes from A to BSA and from BSB to B may decide not
to join the session, in which case the session setup fails. If
A or BSB has an alternative route to the target (BSA for
the initiator route and B for the correspondent route), it
may try to establish the session using that route. Successful
completion of the session setup phase is a conﬁrmation that
both the initiator and the correspondent routes are available
and that all the intermediate nodes on the routes accept to
forward the traﬃc.
Figure 1: The session setup phase
In order to set up a session, A generates an initiator ses-
sion setup request message AReq0 that contains a fresh re-
quest identiﬁer AReqID (e.g., generated in sequence), the
initiator route ARoute from A to BSA (obtained from the
secure source routing protocol), and some information about
the traﬃc5 to be sent (TraﬃcInfo). In addition, the request
has a ﬁeld oldASID to carry the session ID of the broken
initiator session, in case the request is sent to re-establish
a broken session. This ﬁeld is set to zero in case of a new
session establishment. Finally, AReq0 contains a MAC com-
puted by A using its key KA:
AReq0 = [ AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TraﬃcInfo |
MACKA(AReqID | oldASID | ARoute |
TraﬃcInfo) ]
Each forwarding node i on the initiator route checks the
traﬃc information TraﬃcInfo. If i decides to participate in
5The initiator A may have no precise information about the
traﬃc the correspondent B intends to generate. TraﬃcInfo
is thus an estimation of the expected traﬃc in both direc-
tions. Note that it is not to the beneﬁt of A to underestimate
the traﬃc, because the nodes will most likely interrupt the
packet forwarding service provision if the amount of data to
forward is much larger than expected.
the forwarding of the speciﬁed traﬃc, then it computes a
MAC on the whole request (including the MAC already in
the request) using its own key Ki, replaces the MAC in the
request with the newly computed MAC, and forwards the
request. In other words, each node i (1 ≤ i ≤ a) on the
initiator route sends the request message AReqi to the next
intermediate node on the route (or to BSA) where:
AReqi = [ AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TraﬃcInfo |
MACKi(AReqi−1) ]
Thus, when the request arrives to BSA, it contains a single
MAC that was computed by A and all the nodes on the route
in an iterative manner. From a cryptographic point of view,
our “MAC layering” technique achieves a similar eﬀect to
that where each node on the route attached its own MAC
to the request. But the traditional solution of attaching a
new MAC would increase the size of the request, whereas in
our case, the size of the request remains constant. Therefore,
our technique is more eﬃcient in terms of bandwidth. To the
best of our knowledge, such a scheme has not been proposed
yet for ad hoc networks.
BSA then repeats all the MAC computations and checks
the result against the MAC in the received request. It also
veriﬁes that the request ID is fresh (i.e., the message is not a
duplicate) and if the request is sent to re-establish a broken
initiator session, it veriﬁes that oldASID corresponds to a
valid session identiﬁer previously initiated by A. If these
veriﬁcations are not successful, then the base station BSA
drops the request. Otherwise, it sends the request, via the
backbone, to the base station BSB that generates and sends
a correspondent session setup request BReq0 towards the
correspondent where:
BReq0 = [ BReqID | oldBSID | BRoute | TraﬃcInfo ]
BReqID is a fresh request identiﬁer generated by the base
station BSB , oldBSID is the session ID of the broken corre-
spondent session, in case the request is sent to re-establish
a broken session (set to zero in case of a new session estab-
lishment), and BRoute is the source route between BSB and
the correspondent B.
In case of initiator session re-establishment, it is not nec-
essary to also re-establish the correspondent session if it is
still valid. BSA then generates and sends an initiator session
setup conﬁrmation message AConf towards the initiator (as
explained hereafter) and both base stations (BSA and BSB )
link the new initiator session ID to the existent correspon-
dent session ID by updating the information about the ses-
sion in the operator’s database.
The correspondent session setup request is processed by
the forwarding nodes on the correspondent route in the same
way as for the initiator session setup request. Each down-
stream forwarding node j (1 ≤ j ≤ b) computes and sends
BReqj where:
BReqj = [ BReqID | oldBSID | BRoute | TraﬃcInfo |
MACKj (BReqj−1) ]
When the correspondent receives the request BReqb, it re-
turns to BSB a correspondent session setup reply BRep that
contains the correspondent request ID BReqID and a MAC
that is computed over the received request BReqb (including
the MAC therein) using the key KB of B:
BRep = [ BReqID | MACKB (BReqb) ]
Thus, the reply BRep contains a single MAC that was
computed by all the nodes on the correspondent route and
B in an iterative manner. The reply is relayed back with-
out any modiﬁcation to BSB on the reverse route of the
request. The base station BSB checks the “layered” MAC
in the reply, and if it veriﬁes correctly, BSB informs BSA
that the session is valid and both BSA and BSB send an
initiator (respectively correspondent) session setup conﬁr-
mation message towards A (respectively B). The initiator
session setup conﬁrmation message AConf contains the ini-
tiator request ID AReqID , a freshly generated random num-
ber representing the initiator session ID ASID and a series
of MACs where each MAC is intended for one of the nodes
on the initiator route and one MAC is for A:
AConf = [ AReqID | ASID | AMACA | AMAC 1 |
. . . | AMAC a ]
AMAC i = MACKi(AReqID | ASID | oldASID |
ARoute | TraﬃcInfo)
The correspondent session setup conﬁrmation BConf has
a similar structure:
BConf = [ BReqID | BSID | BMAC 1 | . . . |
BMAC b | BMACB ]
BMAC j = MACKj (BReqID | BSID | oldBSID |
BRoute | TraﬃcInfo)
Each node i on the initiator and correspondent routes
(including A and B) veriﬁes its own AMAC or BMAC and
stores the initiator or correspondent session ID, respectively.
The state information related to the established initiator
and correspondent sessions (including session IDs, routes,
and cryptographic parameters) is stored in the operator’s
database.
In case of correspondent session re-establishment, it is not
necessary to also re-establish the initiator session if it is still
valid. BSB thus establishes the correspondent session as
explained previously and base stations BSA and BSB link
the new correspondent session ID to the existent initiator
session ID.
5.3 Packet sending
Once the session has been set up, the source S (who can
be interchangeably A or B) starts sending packets to the
destination D (who is therefore B or A, respectively). The
-th packet SPkt0,	 sent by S contains the session ID SSID
(which is ASID if S = A and BSID if S = B), the sequence
number , and the payload Payload	. In addition, the in-
tegrity of the packet is protected and authentication of its
source is provided by a MAC computed on the packet using
the secret key KS :
SPkt0,	 = [ SSID | Body0,	 ]
Body0,	 =  | Payload	 | MACKS (SSID |  | Payload	)
The MAC in SPkt0,	, however, can and will only be ver-
iﬁed by BSS ; intermediate nodes will simply ignore it. In-
stead of verifying the MAC, each node i (1 ≤ i ≤ s) on the
up-stream route encrypts the body of the packet (including
the MAC) by XORing it with the pad PAD i,	:
SPkt i,	 = [ SSID | Bodyi,	 ]
Bodyi,	 = PAD i,	 ⊕ Bodyi−1,	
The pads PAD i,	 are generated from the session identiﬁer
and the secret key Ki of node i in the following way (see Fig-
ure 2). The up-stream session identiﬁer SSID (DSID for the
down-stream nodes) and Ki are used as a seed to initialize
the key stream generator of the stream cipher. Then, PAD i,	
is chosen as the -th block of length MaxLength of the gen-
erated key stream, where MaxLength denotes the maximum
allowed length of packets in bytes. If the actual length L	
of the packet to be encrypted is smaller than MaxLength,
then only the ﬁrst L	 bytes of PAD i,	 are used, the rest of
PAD i,	 is thrown away.
Figure 2: Encryption of the packets
When the base station BSS receives the packet, it looks up
its internal table using SSID in the packet as index, retrieves
the secret keys of the forwarding nodes on the up-stream
route and of the source, recomputes the pads PAD i,	, and
removes all encryptions from the packet. Then, it veriﬁes
the MAC of the source in the packet and checks that the
sequence number has not already been used (i.e., the packet
is not a duplicate). If one of these veriﬁcations is not suc-
cessful, then it drops the packet. Otherwise, it forwards it
to the base station of the destination BSD . BSD changes
the up-stream session ID to the corresponding down-stream
session ID DSID , computes a new MAC using the secret
key of the destination D, computes the pad PADj,	 for each
forwarding node j (1 ≤ j ≤ d) on the down-stream route,
and encrypts the packet (including the MAC) by iteratively
XORing it with every pad PADj,	. The result is the follow-
ing:
DPkt0,	 = [ DSID | Body0,	 ]
Body0,	 = PAD1,	 ⊕ PAD2,	 ⊕ . . .⊕ PADd,	 ⊕ Body ′0,	
Body ′0,	 =  | Payload	 | MACKD (DSID |  | Payload	)
BSD storesMACKD (DSID |  | Payload	) of every packet
it sends together with the corresponding sequence number 
in order to be able to verify future destination acknowledge-
ments (see Subsection 5.6).
Upon reception of DPktj−1,	, each down-stream forward-
ing node j decrypts the body of DPktj−1,	 by XORing it
with the pad PADj,	, and forwards the result DPktj,	 to the
next hop where:
DPktj,	 = [ DSID | Bodyj,	 ]
Bodyj,	 = PADj,	 ⊕ Bodyj−1,	
Thus, when the packet arrives to D, all encryption pads
have been removed, and D can verify the MAC generated by
BSD . D stores the MAC together with the sequence number
 for generating an acknowledgement to the base station (see
Subsection 5.6).
5.4 Session states
The base stations and every node involved in a session
(i.e., the source, the destination, and the up-stream and
down-stream forwarding nodes) consider the session to be
in one of the following two possible states: active or closed.
A session becomes active for the base stations when they
send the session setup conﬁrmation messages AConf and
BConf . For every node involved, the session becomes active
when it receives a valid AConf or BConf .
Each entity i involved in a session starts a timer ti when
the session becomes active for it. ti is restarted each time i
receives a valid packet that belongs to the session. The node
i closes the session if the timer ti expires or if i receives one
of the error messages related to the session and described
in 5.5. For the nodes (except the destination), closing a
session means that they can delete the related state infor-
mation from their memories. The destination and the base
station BSD will keep state information until the destination
sends and the base station receives the destination acknowl-
edgement message.
5.5 Error handling
It is possible for a forwarding node i (both in the up-
stream and the down-stream route) to explicitly provoke
closing the session. This can happen in any of the following
situations:
• Sending packets to the next hop on the route fails (i.e.,
i does not receive any acknowledgment from the next
hop at the data link layer). In this case, i generates a
Broken Session Error and sends it towards the sender
(i.e., the source S if i is an up-stream forwarding node,
or the base station BSD if i is a down-stream forward-
ing node) to inform the previous forwarding nodes and
the sender that the route is broken.
• i receives a packet to forward with an unknown session
ID. It then generates an Unknown Session ID Error
and sends it back to the sender.
• For some reason i does not want to (or cannot) par-
ticipate in the packet forwarding anymore. It then
generates a Cancellation Error and sends it back to
the sender.
When the sender receives any of these error messages,
it initiates a session re-establishment using an alternative
route.
The forwarding nodes are motivated to relay these error
messages; Indeed, as long as the “problematic session” is ac-
tive, they keep receiving useless packets (these packets will
never reach the destination via this speciﬁc route, meaning
that the forwarding nodes will not get rewarded). Consider-
ing that the reception of all these useless packets is energy
consuming (probably more than sending a short error mes-
sage), it is not beneﬁcial for the nodes to discard these error
messages.
As these messages are not secured, one possible attack
would be to forge a fake error message. But even if we
secured these messages, it would always be possible for an
attacker to provoke a session closing using other mechanisms
(e.g., jamming attacks or denial of service attacks [11]).
5.6 Destination acknowledgement
The destination D must acknowledge the reception of ev-
ery packet. However, in order to save resources, it does not
send acknowledgements on a per packet basis. Instead, it
acknowledges all received packets in a single batch when it
considers the session to be closed (see Subsection 5.4). D
sends the destination acknowledgement DAck when it has a
good (preferably single-hop) connection to any base station.
The format of the acknowledgment message is as follows:
DAck = [ DSID | Batch | LastPkt | LostPkts |
MACKD (DSID | Batch | LastPkt | LostPkts) ]
where LastPkt is the sequence number of the last packet
received in the session, LostPkts is a set of sequence numbers
of missing packets preceding LastPkt and
Batch =
⊕
 ≤ LastPkt
 ∈ LostPkts
MACKD (DSID |  | Payload	)
where MACKD (DSID |  | Payload	) is the MAC received
in the packet with sequence number .
The rationale of this acknowledgement format is based on
the assumption that, in most of the cases, there will only
be a few packets missing and therefore LostPkts is small.
In addition, the most likely reason for packet loss is failure
of the route (e.g., because of node mobility), in which case,
only packets following LastPkt are lost, and these are not
included in LostPkts.
When a base station receives an acknowledgement, it ﬁrst
veriﬁes theMACKD (DSID | Batch | LastPkt | LostPkts). It
then checks Batch by XORing all the MACs of the packets
up to LastPkt and excluding those in LostPkts and compar-
ing the result to the received value. If the veriﬁcation fails
then the base station ignores the acknowledgement.
5.7 Charging
As we already mentioned in Section 4, charging and re-
muneration are implemented by the manipulation of the ac-
counts of the nodes; this operation is performed by the net-
work operator. When BSS receives a packet P	 of length
L	 that veriﬁes correctly, then the initiator A is charged for
a given amount n(L	) (depending on the packet size). If
the correspondent B is the sender of the packet, it is also
charged n(L	) to prevent a free-riding attack: as A pays
for the communication, B can be tempted to use the ses-
sion to communicate freely with a colluding node that is in
the route to A. The colluder would receive the packets and
drop them after extracting the useful information. If B is
charged n(L	), cheating is not interesting anymore because
it is equivalent to establishing a session with the colluding
node and communicating regularly. B is refunded n(L	) if
and only if the operator receives a valid acknowledgement
for the packet6 P	.
The up-stream forwarding nodes (the nodes in the path
between S and BSS ) are remunerated when the packet rea-
ches BSS and the down-stream forwarding nodes (the nodes
in the path between BSD and D) are remunerated when the
6The packet can be lost in the way to the destination be-
cause of misbehavior (e.g., free-riding attack) or because of a
broken link. As the operator cannot distinguish between the
two cases, it keeps n(L	) if no acknowledgement is received
from the destination of the packet.
operator receives the destination acknowledgement message
that acknowledges the reception of the packet P	. Each
forwarding node (both in the up-stream and in the down-
stream) receives a credit of α(L	). In order to motivate the
destination to send an acknowledgement, the destination is
also charged a small amount ε (that is refunded only if the
corresponding packet is acknowledged by the destination)
when BSD injects the packet into the down-stream route.
If no acknowledgement arrives, then the operator keeps the
charge7 ε.
As both n(L	) and α(L	) depend on the packet size and
not on the number of forwarding nodes in the path, the op-
erator will take a loss for long routes but will make a proﬁt
from short routes. The charge n(L	) and the rewards α(L	)
should thus be set so that – relative to the average path
length – the operator makes the desired proﬁt on average.
More details about the averaging principle for micropay-
ments are presented in [26].
6. SECURITY
As we will see in Subsection 6.1, we provide incentives to
foster collaboration between rational participants. Further-
more, we design our protocol in a way that it also provides
disincentives against cheating (see Subsection 6.2).
6.1 Incentives for collaboration
The up-stream nodes beneﬁt from forwarding a packet,
since once this packet has been received by the base sta-
tion (but only then), each of them will be credited for their
collaboration. The down-stream nodes beneﬁt from ﬁrst for-
warding a packet, and then (in the opposite direction) the
acknowledgement, since each of them will be credited once
the base station receives this acknowledgement. The desti-
nation beneﬁts from sending the acknowledgement, since it
will be reimbursed once this is received by the base station.
While neither the down-stream nodes nor the destination
will be credited if the acknowledgement does not make it to
the base station, the source will still be debited the same
amount (at the receipt of the packet by the base station).
Therefore, it is not rational for the source to collude with
the destination or any down-stream nodes to drop the ac-
knowledgement. Down-stream nodes may collude with the
destination to only send information suﬃcient to construct
the acknowledgement (or explicitly construct this using se-
cret information of the destination), yet this is not rational
from the point of view of the destination, who supposedly
derives some beneﬁt from receiving the packet and who does
not want to give out its secret key, since this allows others
to impersonate it.
6.2 Disincentives against cheating
Instead of proving security against any existing combina-
tion of adversarial behaviors, we will argue that our protocol
is resistant against any attack from a set of well-speciﬁed
sorts. In the following, we describe primarily those attacks
corresponding to a ﬁltering adversary. This will be followed
by a brief discussion on security corresponding to an invasive
adversary.
7The packet can be, for some reason, lost in the down-stream
route. However, as the operator cannot distinguish between
this case and the one where D does not want to send the
acknowledgment to save resources, it charges D in all cases.
Security against a refusal to pay: Each node acting
as a source needs to attach a MAC of the packet sent. This
MAC can only be computed with the knowledge of the se-
cret key of the associated device. We have assumed that
the base stations are trusted; therefore, they will not gen-
erate such a MAC on behalf of a node, and nobody else
knows the secret key needed to generate the MAC. There-
fore, the MAC uniquely identiﬁes the initiator, who cannot
claim to not have initiated the sending of the associated
packet. Therefore, if a node refuses to pay, he can be dis-
connected from the network in the future (by having the
base stations not recognize his MACs). In addition, some
deposit may be rescinded. The combination of these mea-
sures makes it foolish to refuse to pay for packets that are
received by the base station.
Security against incorrect reward claims: A node
will be credited if it (a) appears to the base station to be
part of a route during session setup, and (b) appears to be
part of the route during the packet transmission. The former
is determined by the base station from the MACs applied on
a message associated with the session setup; each such MAC
requires knowledge of the associated secret key of the node.
The latter is determined by means of a correct packet (for
the up-stream forwarding nodes) or acknowledgement (for
the down-stream forwarding nodes). The base station will
apply decryptions/encryptions corresponding to each node
on the up-stream or the down-stream routes. If these are not
matched by the application of the same encryption/decryp-
tion of the node in question, the packet or the acknowledge-
ment will be incorrect. The encryptions/decryptions require
knowledge of the secret keys of the associated nodes. Un-
der the ﬁltering assumption, these are never shared, and
therefore each node in the route (as understood by the base
stations) need to be involved in the routing in order (for any
of them) to be credited.
Security against free-riding: Free-riding is when two
parties who are not direct neighbors piggy-back information
on packets they are routing, allowing the “latter” node to
receive the string from the “former” one. If an adversary
attaches some string to a packet in transmission, or replaces
some portion of the packet with such a string, then the string
will be encrypted or decrypted at least once. Since the two
parties will not know the key of the party or parties perform-
ing this encryption/decryption, the string will be garbled.
The only thing the attackers can do is to pass information
by manipulation of the length of the packets; this is a chan-
nel of such low bandwidth that it is not a relevant practical
threat to consider.
Security against an invasive adversary: Above, we
have described how the simple cryptographic mechanisms
of our scheme defend against various ﬁltering attacks. The
power of the adversary is increased in several ways by tak-
ing the step to an invasive adversary. First of all, given that
the adversary may extract the secret keys of the devices he
controls, each such device may then emulate all controlled
devices. Practically speaking, this means that one device
may “act” as several consecutive devices but only incurring
the communication costs of a single device. If successfully
performed, this would have a profound eﬀect on how re-
wards are assigned. Although the invasive adversary is also
assumed to be able to cause modiﬁcations of the routing ta-
bles of honest devices (which has an eﬀect somewhat of a
similar nature to that of the “emulation attack”), the un-
derlying source routing we use in our protocol is expected
to be secure and thus we do not consider “invasive routing
misbehavior” in this paper.
Whereas these attacks cannot be defended against in a
deﬁnitive manner, there are satisfactory statistical approa-
ches that detect and provide evidence of such behavior and
allow a better accuracy with an increased degree of cheating.
We give an example of these techniques in the following.
Detecting emulated nodes: The network operator can
employ statistical methods to determine if the set of con-
current neighbors is inconsistent (e.g., whether some node is
claimed to be in several physical locations simultaneously).
Furthermore, statistical methods can be used to determine
whether certain nodes relay more traﬃc than is reasonable,
given the type of the node. Either of these events suggests
that the device in question is dishonest, which increases the
likelihood that neighbors (along the routes this device is on)
are, too. It is also possible to detect such misbehavior if the
operator captures a rogue device containing a set of keys be-
longing to other participants. This is an indication that all
such participants are dishonest and thus, the larger the sets
of collaborating cheaters, the greater the risk for a rogue de-
vice to be captured. Finally, the operator can suspect such
an attack if two or more nodes seem to be always neighbors,
despite mobility. More heuristics can be found in [19].
7. OVERHEAD
In this section, we will provide an estimate of the commu-
nication and computation overheads of the solution we have
described. An estimate of the size of the diﬀerent ﬁelds ap-
pearing in our protocol is provided by Table 1.
Field Name Size (bytes)
ReqID 4
SID 4
oldSID 4
Route NbFwdrs*16
TraﬃcInfo 16
MAC 16
 2
LostPkts NbLostPkts*2
Table 1: Size of the ﬁelds we used in our protocol
(for both up and down streams)
NbFwdrs is the number of forwarding nodes in the route
(up-stream or down-stream),  is the sequence number of the
packet and NbLostPkts is the number of packets lost during
the session.
The ﬁelds ReqID, SID and oldSID are encoded on 4 bytes
each to avoid the risk of using the same identiﬁer for two dif-
ferent requests or sessions. The ﬁeld Route is the concate-
nation of the 16 bytes identiﬁers (assuming e.g. an IPv6
format) of the forwarding nodes. The TraﬃcInfo ﬁeld is
used to inform the forwarding nodes (both in the up-stream
and in the down-stream routes) about the characteristics of
the traﬃc the initiator and the correspondent intend to ex-
change; using 16 bytes to encode it seems to be reasonable.
Finally, we encode the sequence number on 2 bytes to sup-
port long sessions (we can have up to 216 packets in a single
session).
7.1 Communication Overhead
7.1.1 Session Setup Phase
According to Table 1, establishing an initiator session with
NbFwdrs forwarding nodes represents an overhead of 64 +
NbFwdrs ∗ 32 bytes while establishing a correspondent ses-
sion with the same number of forwarding nodes represents an
overhead of 84+NbFwdrs∗32 bytes (40+NbFwdrs∗16 bytes
overhead for the requests AReq and BReq , 20 bytes overhead
for the reply DSSRep and 24+NbFwdrs∗16 bytes overhead
for the conﬁrmation messages AConf and BConf ). This
means that the overhead represented by the session setup is
directly related to the lifetime of the sessions, which, in turn,
very much depends on the stability of the routes. Hence, we
have studied the stability of the routes, by means of simu-
lations.
Description of the simulations: We consider a net-
work composed of 100 nodes and one base station. The
nodes are randomly laid out on a 500x500 m2 single cell8
and the base station is situated in the center of the cell. We
ﬁx the power range of the nodes and the base station to
100 m.
We use the random waypoint mobility model [20]. The
speed is uniformly chosen between 0 and 20 m/s (note that
according to [32], the average speed is lower than 10 m/s)
with diﬀerent values of the pause time (PauseT ): 0, 60, 120,
300 and 600 s [4]. We discard the ﬁrst 1000 seconds of
simulation time to remove the initial transient phase of the
random waypoint mobility model [9] and we run 100 simu-
lations for each value of the pause time.
Figures of interest: In our simulations we are interested
in the three following ﬁgures:
• The average lifetime of a route (AvrLT ). After the ini-
tial transient phase of each simulation, we randomly
choose a node that has a route to the local base station
and we observe the lifetime of this route. The simula-
tion ends when the route is broken (i.e., at least one
link is broken). AvrLT represents the average value
of all these lifetime values over the 100 simulations.
Note that we consider the route on only one side of
the communication (the initiator or the correspondent
route) and not the end-to-end route.
• The average number of forwarding nodes (NbFwdrs).
This number is computed for the node we consider for
the AvrLT. We do not expect this number to be large
for multi-hop cellular networks.
• The average percentage of nodes that have no route
to the local base station (Noroute). It gives an idea
about the connectivity of the network.
Results: The results, given in Table 2, show that the
network is highly connected (Noroute is low) and that the
stability of the routes decreases for a higher mobility of for-
warding nodes. We consider a 95% conﬁdence interval (CI ).
If we consider pause time = 0 s, the route remains stable
for an average of 8.2 s. In order to estimate the amount of
information that a node can send during this period of time,
let us consider the case where the nodes are running a Voice
8The shape of the simulated cell is therefore a square; in fact,
the speciﬁc shape does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results of
the presented simulations.
PauseT (s) 600 300 120 60 0
Noroute 0.22% 0.06% 0.25% 0.16% 0.22%
NbFwdrs 2 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.4
AvrLT (s) 325.2 73 40.5 21.6 8.2
95% CI 15.3 21.9 15.5 14.3 6.6
Table 2: Simulation results for the diﬀerent values
of the pause time (Random speed between 0 and
20 m/s)
over IP application using a G.711 Codec (Rate = 64 kbit/s)
with a frame size (including the headers) of 200 bytes [10].
It is possible during 8.2 s to send 410 packets, representing
65.6 kbytes of data.
The overhead of an end-to-end session setup is 237.6 bytes
(the average number of forwarding nodes is 1.4), which rep-
resents only 0.3% of the amount of information (payload)
it is possible to send during the session. Moreover, as ex-
plained in Subsection 5.2, it is possible to re-establish only
the broken session (the initiator session or the correspondent
session) which reduces this overhead.
7.1.2 Packet Sending Phase
Considering the ﬁeld sizes of Table 1, we can see that
the packet sending phase represents an overhead of 22 bytes
per packet (4 bytes for the session identiﬁer, 2 bytes for the
sequence number and 16 bytes for the MAC).
If the packet size is 200 bytes (same example as in para-
graph 7.1.1), the overhead represents 11% of the packet size.
This overhead is reduced if we use larger packets.
7.1.3 Sending the Acknowledgment
Sending the acknowledgment is an oﬄine operation that
the destination does once per session. It represents an over-
head of (38+2*NbLostPkts) bytes per session (4 bytes for
the session identiﬁer, 16 bytes for Batch, 2 bytes for LastPkt ,
16 bytes for the MAC and 2*NbLostPkts for LostPkts). As-
suming the pessimistic value of NbLostPkts = 100, sending
the acknowledgment represents an overhead of 238 bytes per
session.
7.2 Computation Overhead
In this subsection, we consider the computation overhead
for the mobile nodes. The overhead is expressed in terms
of number of computations and battery consumption. How-
ever, as shown in [30], we can consider the battery con-
sumption due to cryptographic computations as negligible
compared to the energy needed for data transmission.
Session Setup Phase: This operation requires the ini-
tiator and the intermediate nodes to perform 2 MAC com-
putations each.
Packet Sending Phase: The main overhead in this
phase is represented by the usage of stream cipher encryp-
tion (performed by the source and all the forwarders) which
ensures the authentication of the nodes involved in the com-
munication and prevents the free riding attack. But stream
ciphers are very fast, and some operate at a speed compa-
rable to that of 32 bit CRC computation [14]. It is possible
for us to use an even faster construction with weaker crypto-
graphic guarantees: We can use output segments of a strong
stream cipher to key a weak but extremely fast stream ci-
pher, allowing for frequent rekeying; Thus, if an adversary
breaks the weak cipher, he can only beneﬁt from this until
the next (automatic) rekeying. Note that the use of a weak
cipher only allows temporary free-riding, but not stronger
attacks (e.g., impersonation). Moreover, for each packet,
the source has to perform one MAC computation and the
destination one MAC veriﬁcation.
Acknowledgment computation: During this opera-
tion, the destination needs to perform one MAC computa-
tion and to compute the Batch ﬁeld, which requires a XOR
operation for each received packet.
Numerical example: As an example, a processor Cele-
ron 850 MHz under Windows 2000 SP can perform a MAC
computation (and veriﬁcation) with HMAC/MD5 algorithm
at 99.863 Mbytes/s and a stream cipher encryption (and
decryption) using Panama Cipher (little endian) algorithm
at 120.301 Mbytes/s [14]. These speeds are to exemplify the
range; if slower (or faster) processors are used, it of course
would scale correspondingly.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of cooper-
ation for packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks.
We have proposed a set of protocols that rely exclusively on
symmetric cryptography techniques, and are therefore com-
pliant with the limited resources of most mobile stations.
We have studied several kinds of attacks and shown that
our system is able to resist to them. A fundamental design
decision consists in relying on the concept of session, which
tests and exploits the relative stability of routes. We have
quantiﬁed the life time of these sessions and we have shown
that they help keeping the overhead moderate. We have
also proven that the usage of our charging and rewarding
scheme indeed stimulates cooperation in multi-hop cellular
networks.
In terms of future work, we intend to explore further the
invasive attacks and to consider routing misbehavior. We
will explore techniques aiming at the calibration of the rel-
evant parameters, and extend our protocols to include the
case in which the correspondent is charged. We will also
consider the use of session keys in order to reduce the com-
munication overhead between the base stations and the key
repository. Finally, we will extend the charging and reward-
ing principle and make it possible to remunerate the inter-
mediate nodes even for the packets that did not reach their
target.
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